Tax Litigation

a journal devoted to litigation issues for tax practitioners

 
Volume XII, No. 3 2004
Highlights

GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE

Capitalizing on the Demise of the General Anti-avoidance Rule?
Duane R. Milot
In Imperial Oil v. The Queen, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the Tax Court of Canada, which determined that the general anti-avoidance rule did not prohibit the taxpayer from reducing its liability for large corporations tax ("LCT") under Part 1.3 of the Income Tax Act by taking advantage of a well-known "loophole" in the statutory scheme. In the Court's view, the transactions in question were "perfectly foreseeable" to Parliament and the structure of the LCT "virtually invited" the use of the strategy employed by the taxpayer. As Duane Milot explains, the judgment in Imperial Oil offers a boon to taxpayers and presents a significant challenge to the Minister of National Revenue in areas where a clear and unambiguous statutory policy is not readily ascertainable.

GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE

General anti-Avoidance Rule Battle Comes to the Supreme Court of Canada
David E. Spiro
Since the Tax Court of Canada heard McNichol v. The Queen in 1997, the courts have been called upon to consider the general anti-avoidance rule ("GAAR") in numerous cases, but the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to hear its first GAAR appeal. That will change with Kaulius et al. v. The Queen and The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company. In Kaulius, the Supreme Court will focus on issues relating to the identification and assessment of the relevant "clear and unambiguous" policies in the Income Tax Act. In Canada Trustco, the Court will consider the Crown's argument that the GAAR has been misunderstood and misapplied by the lower courts. David Spiro discusses the Appellants' positions in both appeals and selected aspects of the case law.

COLLECTIONS

New Limitation Periods Added Post-Markevich
James W. Murdoch
In The Queen v. Markevich, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown was precluded from collecting a long-outstanding tax debt by virtue >of the limitation periods contained in federal and provincial limitation statutes of general application. In response to Markevich, legislative amendments to section 222 of the Income Tax Act were tabled, which provide for a ten-year limitation period for the collection of all tax debts. However, as James Murdoch observes, the new legislation also appears to have the effect of reviving any and all tax debts that arose before March 4, 2004. The author critiques the new legislation and argues that its controversial retroactive operation goes far beyond what was required to fill in the gaps in the former statutory collections regime.

 

Board

David C. Nathanson, QC
Editor-in-Chief
Lerners LLP

Jacques Bernier
Bennett Jones LLP

Patrick J. Boyle
Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP

William I. Innes
Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP

Edwin G. Kroft
McCarthy Tétrault LLP

Warren J.A. Mitchell, QC
Thorsteinssons

Kenneth S. Skingle
Felesky Flynn LLP

David E. Spiro
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP

Joanne E. Swystun
Stikeman Elliott

Roger E. Taylor
Couzin Taylor LLP

Matthew G. Williams
Thorsteinssons

Adrienne K. Woodyard
Lerners LLP